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Note 
Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago?  An 
Examination of Post-Mortem Conception and 
Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against 
Perpetuities 
Joshua Greenfield∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A man is presumed to be the father of a child if he is 
married to the child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth or if 
the child is born within 300 days after the marriage is 
terminated by death.1  The presumption of parenthood is an 
outgrowth of the common law rule that a child born to a widow 
within 280 days of her husband’s death is the legal issue of the 
widow’s husband.2  This presumption is important because most 
people die intestate (without a will).3  While rules on intestate 
succession vary, the deceased’s estate is typically divided among 
any surviving spouse and children.  A death-imposed natural 
limit on a father’s paternity characterized the outer limits of 
parentage possible until 1949, when a viable method for 
      ©    2007 Joshua Greenfield. 
       ∗    University of Minnesota J.D. candidate (2007). 
 1. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)–(3) (2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upa/final2002.pdf.  The assumption also 
applies to dissolution of the marriage by annulment, declaration of invalidity, 
divorce, or court decree of separation.  Id.  The presumption of parenthood is 
rebuttable by adjudication.  Id. § 204(b). 
 2. Robert J. Kerekes, My Child . . . But Not My Heir: Technology, the Law, 
and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 213, 214 (1996). 
 3. Id. at 225. 
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preserving sperm outside of the male body was discovered.4 
This discovery made it technologically possible for a man to 
fertilize an ovum after his death, resulting in paternity of a child 
born more than 300 days after the father’s death.5  The 
possibility of a child born long after a father’s death, who is 
therefore potentially not recognized as the legal heir of the 
father, is significant because much of the legal interaction that is 
taken for granted between a child and his or her parent is based 
upon the law’s presumption of legitimacy.  Prominent among 
these interactions are the laws that determine how a child 
inherits from his or her parent, whether through testate or 
intestate succession. 
Though the technology has existed for decades, and potential 
problems were recognized fairly early,6 issues surrounding the 
treatment of children of posthumous conception for inheritance 
purposes have become far more pressing in the past decade.  
Over the fifty-five year period between 1998 and 2052, 
Americans will engage in a wealth transfer of at least $41 
trillion through both testate and intestate succession.7  If the 
problems discussed in this article were involved in even 1/100 of 
1% of this transfer, more than $4 billion would be at issue. 
This article will begin by giving a brief history of assisted 
reproduction technologies, allowing the reader to understand 
how we came to the present dilemma.  It will then focus on two 
 4. Cindy L. Steeb, A Child Conceived After His Father’s Death?: 
Posthumous Reproduction and Inheritance Rights.  An Analysis of Ohio 
Statutes, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137, 140 (2000). 
 5. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last 
Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91 (2004). This possibility became reality in 1977: “an 
Australian newspaper reported that a widow had given birth to a child using 
her deceased husband’s cryopreserved sperm.”  Id. at 92 (citing Carolyn 
Sappideen, Life After Death—Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpetuities, 53 AUSTL. 
L.J. 311, 311 n.4 (1979)).  While it is now possible for women to reproduce post-
mortem through cyropreservation of eggs and embryos and the use of a 
surrogate, this technology will not be discussed in this article. 
 6. Id. at 92 (noting that in 1962, Harvard Professor W. Barton Leach 
predicted the challenges that births from cyropreservation of sperm would 
provide for the Rule against Perpetuities). 
 7. John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth 
Transfer Estimate is Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Comments, 7 J. 
GIFT PLAN. 11, 11 (2003).  The $41 trillion figure commonly reported in the 
media is the result of an assumed “real secular growth” rate of 2%.  Id.  A 3% 
growth rate would result in a wealth transfer of $73 trillion and a 4% rate in a 
$136 trillion transfer.  Id.  The value of household wealth had a growth rate of 
3.34% (inflation adjusted) for the period of 1950-2001.  Id. at 11-12. 
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areas where post-mortem conception has the potential to interact 
with current law:8 the inheritance rights of post-mortem-
conception children9 and the potential effect of cryopreservation 
technology on the Rule against Perpetuities. 10  Attempts have 
been made over the years to adapt the law to new reproductive 
technologies.  None of them fully answered the questions posed, 
and all failed to keep up with changing technology. 
This article will conclude that the only workable solution for 
dealing with post-mortem-conception children and their 
inheritance rights is to establish a hard cutoff for establishing 
paternity in those children who it can not be proven were in 
gestation at the time of the father’s death. Any testate provisions 
that provide for after-born children must be “reworked” to match 
the testator’s intent as best as possible, without violating the 
new rule.  Any reworking must also take into account the Rule 
against Perpetuity’s original purpose. 
 8. These issues are far from the only ones raised by post-mortem 
conception.  Two of the most discussed topics not addressed in this article are 
the status of sperm and embryos as property and the ethical ramifications of 
allowing harvesting of sperm after brain death.  For a discussion of the property 
status of sperm, see Andrea Corvalán, Fatherhood After Death: A Legal and 
Ethical Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction, 7 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 335, 338-
51 (1997).  Responses to the issue of harvesting sperm post-brain death have 
varied but there may be a growing mini-consensus that the procedure should be 
allowed when there is a showing of pre-mortem intent and approval by the 
decedent’s spouse/partner.  See NEW YORK HOSPITAL GUIDELINES FOR 
CONSIDERATION OF REQUEST FOR POST-MORTEM SPERM RETRIEVAL, 
http://www.cornellurology.com/guidelines.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) 
(maintaining that the wife, as next of kin, should be the only one empowered to 
make the decision on post-mortem sperm harvesting); see also Michele Chabin, 
Israeli Parents Unable to Harvest Dead Son’s Sperm, Court Decides, J. THE 
JEWISH NEWS WKLY OF N. CAL., Dec. 5, 2003, available at 
http://www.jewishsf.com/ (search “Israeli parents unable to harvest dead son’s 
sperm”; then click on hyperlink to article).  Britain has “actively discouraged” 
post-mortem harvesting since 1984.  Knaplund, supra note 5, at 100-01.  Post-
mortem harvesting may be becoming more prevalent in the United States; in 
1995 fertility clinics reported more than forty such requests, as many request as 
reported total in the fourteen previous years. Id. at 93-94. 
 9. Post-mortem-conception children refers to any situation where a child is 
conceived or an embryo implanted after one of the child’s biological parents has 
died.  Exceptions are anonymous donors or  surrogacy arrangements in which 
the biological parent(s) were never intended to act as legal parent(s). 
 10. “[T]he rule against perpetuities is ‘No interest is good unless it must 
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest.’”  JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 302 
(5th ed. 2002) (quoting JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 
(4th ed. 1942)). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE TECHNOLOGY 
Although it is not certain where the idea first arose that a 
child could be conceived other than through sexual intercourse, 
the recognition of such a possibility is at least 2000 years old.11  
The idea was first put into practice over 600 years ago as a way 
of gaining an edge in battle when Arab tribes tried to dilute the 
gene pool of enemy tribes’ horses by artificially inseminating 
their mares with the sperm of inferior male horses.12  While such 
practices may have seemed radical in the past, today it is 
possible, conventional, and almost commonplace to at least 
consider the possibility of attempting to have children without 
engaging in sexual intercourse.13 
A woman was first artificially inseminated in a procedure 
performed by an English doctor, Dr. John Hunter, in 1770.14  
The first known successful use of the procedure in the United 
States occurred in 1884.15  Scientists have known for some time 
that sperm could remain viable through cryopreservation,16 the 
act of storing a substance in a frozen state.17  Cryopreservation 
 11. Steeb, supra note 4, at 139.  The oldest known writing that 
contemplates conception without intercourse is a 22 A.D. Talmudic document.  
Id.  The document tells of a rabbi’s discussion that a woman might become 
pregnant from being in bath water ‘contaminated’ with sperm.  Id. 
 12. James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues 
Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of 
Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 746 (1998); accord Steeb, supra note 4, at 
140. 
 13. See Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Morriss, Birth After Death: 
Perpetuities and the New Reproductive Technologies, 38 GA. L. REV. 575, 595 
(2004) (stating that approximately 400,000 frozen embryos are stored in the 
United States).  The number of frozen embryos does not include the number of 
gametes (eggs and sperm) that are cryogenically stored in the United States.  Id. 
at 593-98. 
 14. Steeb, supra note 4, at 140.  There is disagreement as to whether this 
procedure was actually successful.  See Bailey, supra note 12, at 746 n.10 
(acknowledging the attempt by Dr. Hunter and asserting that it was 
unsuccessful). 
 15. Bailey, supra note 12, at 746.  The women was a medical student, as 
was the sperm donor.  Differing eyewitness accounts make this claim uncertain.  
Id. at 818 n.11. 
 16. See Steeb, supra note 4, at 140 (“[I]n 1866, an Italian scientist, 
Montegazza, discovered that sperm could survive being frozen.”). 
 17. P.L. Matson et al., Cryopreservation: Sperm and Embryos – Results in 
Question, in ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 123 (R.W. Shaw ed., 1995).  
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was unsuccessful until 1949, however, when scientists 
discovered that adding a small amount of glycerol before freezing 
greatly increased the viability rate of the sperm.18  Artificial 
insemination using cryopreserved sperm was first successfully 
achieved in Australia in 1977.19 
Cryopreservation is currently the only technique by which 
semen may be stored for extended periods.20  The freezing 
process destroys a number of sperm, but the survival rate is 
approximately 48% to 79%.21  The maximum length of time that 
sperm can remain viable is not currently known, but estimates 
range from twelve years22 to centuries.23  Sperm frozen for 
twenty-one years has been successfully used in artificial 
insemination.24 
Cryopreservation of sperm has been used by (among others) 
astronauts,25 soldiers,26 and cancer patients receiving 
Cryopreservation can be achieved through a process of freezing and vitrification 
(conversion of a liquid into a glass).  Id. 
 18. Id. at 127. 
 19. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 92 & n.8. 
 20. Matson et al., supra note 17, at 123. 
 21. K. Sueoka et al., A New Strategy for the Treatment of Male Infertility 
Due to Severe Oligozoospermia and Azoospermia, in ADVANCES IN HUMAN 
REPRODUCTION 366 (F.A. Moeloek, B. Affandi, & A.O. Trouson eds., 1993).  The 
recovery rate of viable sperm from a frozen state ranges from 48% (plus or 
minus 6%) to 79% (plus or minus 8%), depending on the cyropreservation buffer 
used.  Id.  Merely adding glycerin to the solution resulted in the 48% recovery 
rate, while adding glycerin, egg yolk, and Pluronic F68 resulted in the 79% 
recovery rate.  Id.  A buffer of glycerin and egg yolk resulted in a 69% (plus or 
minus 11%) recovery rate.  Id. 
 22. Sperm Bank Directory, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.spermbankdirectory.com/faq4.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005). 
 23. Stanley W. Ashley, Frozen Sperm May Last for Generations, YOUR 
FAMILY DOCTOR, http://www.online-
ambulance.com/articles/doc/3/grp/Men/art/FrozenSperm.htm (last visited Oct. 
17, 2005); see also Q & A: Frozen Sperm, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2004, 
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/2/hi/health/3745775.stm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005) 
(asserting that cryopreserved sperm “has no apparent sell-by date”). 
 24. Baby Born from 21-Year-Old Sperm, BBC NEWS, May 25, 2004, 
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/2/hi/health/3742319.stm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).  
The baby was born from sperm frozen by the father at age seventeen.  Id.  The 
father froze his sperm in anticipation of going sterile from treatment for 
testicular cancer.  Id. 
 25. Bailey, supra note 12, at 746 (“Modern, widespread application of 
technological advances . . . probably began during the early days of the United 
States space program.  In 1962, Mercury astronauts had their sperm frozen for 
future use in case exposure to cosmic radiation while in orbit rendered them 
sterile.”). 
 26. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 91 n.8 (stating that soldiers deployed to 
the Persian Gulf frequently went to the sperm bank before leaving). 
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chemotherapy or radiation therapy.27  Its use is rising, as the 
Second Gulf War has prompted a “record increase in visits by 
departing military men” to sperm banks.28  The use of 
cryopreservation will most likely increase as the technology 
continues to lengthen the time sperm can be viably 
cryopreserved and tests continue to show the effectiveness of the 
procedure.29 
B. THE LAW 
Prior to the Uniform Parentage Act, children born after the 
biological father’s death were considered to be valid issue of the 
father if they lived 120 hours after birth30 and were born within 
280 days of their father’s death.31  In 1973, the 280-day period 
was extended to 300 days in the Uniform Parentage Act,32 which 
also made the presumption of paternity rebuttable.33  Following 
the promulgation of the Uniform Parentage Act, it became 
increasingly obvious that children were being born or would soon 
be born who would strain the limitations of the Uniform 
Parentage Act.  In 1988, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the 
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act.34  The 
purpose of the Act was to “effect the security and well being of 
those children born and living in our midst as a result of assisted 
 27. See id. (noting a fear among patients that the treatments will make 
them sterile). 
 28. Ellen Gamerman, For U.S. Troops, a Personal Mission, BALT. SUN, Jan. 
27, 2003, at 1A. 
 29. In a recent study, frozen sperm was found to be as effective as fresh 
sperm for effective in vitro fertilization.  Mayo Clinic, Frozen, Fresh Sperm Both 
Effective for In Vitro Fertilization, May 12, 2004, 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/news2004-rst/2258.html.  Data from a ten-year 
period was collected, the data contained 1,580 cycles of fresh sperm attempts 
and 309 cycles using frozen sperm.  Id.  Cycles using fresh sperm produced a 
success rate of 51.6%, cycles using frozen sperm produced a success rate of 
53.1%.  Id. 
 30. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-108 (2006). 
 31. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 214 (stating that the 280 days is a common 
law court doctrine developed through the guidance of the Uniform Probate 
Code). 
 32. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (1973) (amended 2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa7390.pdf. 
 33. Id.  § 4(b). 
 34. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILD. OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988). 
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conception.”35  The Act provides that “[a]n individual who dies 
before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived 
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual’s egg 
or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child.”36  The 
justification for not considering a genetic post-mortem-
conception parent a legal parent is to provide for “finality for the 
determination of parenthood of those whose genetic material is 
utilized in the procreation process after their death.”37 
Though the desirability for finality in determining 
parenthood is a laudable goal, there are both moral and legal 
problems that arise from a firm cutoff period.  Therefore, any 
scheme which involves such a firm cutoff period should be 
narrowly tailored to meet the societal goals of providing for 
efficient transfer of property from the deceased while minimizing 
any harm visited upon posthumously conceived children. 
A child has the constitutional right to a determination of 
paternity.38  This right has never been qualified to exist only for 
those children with living parents, nor should it.  It would be 
illogical to consider a right belonging to Person A as dependent 
upon the status of Person B. 
C. TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
It is generally agreed that provisions in a testator’s will that 
provide for post-mortem-conception children are valid,39 subject 
to the Rule against Perpetuities.  While this notion may be 
comforting, it is not as helpful as one might initially think in 
analyzing the inheritance rights of post-mortem-conception 
children.  The majority of Americans die intestate.40  Therefore, 
 35. Id. prefatory note.  The act was meant to address the “status of 
children, their rights, security, and well being.”  Id. 
 36. Id. § 4(b). 
 37. Id. § 4 cmt. (noting that section 4(b) was designed in response to 
controversy caused by the problem in Australia in the 1980s).  This rule 
coincides with British law under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
of 1990.  See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 101 (stating that the British law 
provides that where the sperm of a man is used after his death, the man is not 
to be treated as the father of a resulting child). 
 38. State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods, 865 P.2d 33, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) 
(citing State v. Santos, 702 P.2d 1179, 1181–82 (Wash. 1985)). 
 39. Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of 
Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV 1091, 1155 (1997).  The article 
suggests that the conveyance could be effected either through keeping open the 
estate, or setting up a statutory trust with the as yet unconceived child as 
beneficiary.  Id. 
 40. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 225.  (“[S]tudies indicate that the large 
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it is important to decide how to treat post-mortem-conception 
children whose parents died intestate. 
An important case in the development of modern intestacy 
law is Trimble v. Gordon.41  In Trimble, a mother challenged the 
constitutionality of an Illinois statute that disallowed intestate 
succession of illegitimate children from their father.42  The Court 
held that the Illinois statue was in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.43  Based on Trimble, any 
distinction that is made based on the legitimacy of the child (or 
presumably a similar status) must be narrowly tailored. 
Cases that have arisen in this area have primarily dealt 
with post-mortem-conception children seeking benefits from the 
state as survivors of their late biological father.  The first case 
that arose was Hart v. Chater.44  Hart arose after Nancy Hart 
successfully used her deceased husband’s cryopreserved sperm to 
conceive a child.45  Ms. Hart sought Social Security survivor's 
benefits for her daughter, Judith Christine Hart, as the daughter 
of her late husband.46  When Ms. Hart was denied Social 
Security benefits for her daughter, she filed for a hearing with 
the Social Security Administration.  Although Ms. Hart was 
unsuccessful the both at the trial and appellate level,47 the 
Social Security Administration eventually reversed its position 
and decided to award survivor benefits to Judith Hart despite 
the previous judgments
majority of people die intestate.”) (quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 67 (5th ed. 1995)). 
 41. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 42. Id. at 763. 
 43. See id. at 776. 
 44. (Soc. Sec. Admin. Hearing) (March 27, 1995) (Torres, A.L.J.), cited in 
Kerekes, supra note 2, at 232.  The material on the Hart case is on file with Mr. 
Kerekes. 
 45. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 232.  The sperm had been frozen in 
anticipation of chemotherapy for the treatment of cancer.  The chemotherapy 
was ultimately unsuccessful, and Edward Hart died.  Id. 
 46. Id.  Nancy Hart also sought (and presumably received) survivor benefits 
for herself.  Id. 
 47. See id. at 232-39.  The Appeals Council found that Judith Hart could 
not inherit as a “child” under Louisiana state law, nor was she Edward Hart’s 
“child” within the meaning of the Social Security Act.  Id. 
 48. Id. at 239-40 (basing its reversal on the “significant policy issues” raised 
by Hart that were not contemplated when the Social Security Act originally was 
passed, and deciding that a resolution of those issues should involve the 
legislative and executive branches). 
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The issue next made headlines in early 2002 with Woodward 
v. Commissioner of Social Security.49  In Woodward, the court 
sought to answer the following question: 
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from 
the husband for the purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, and 
the woman is impregnated with that sperm after the man, her 
husband, has died, will children resulting from such pregnancy enjoy 
the inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts’ law of 
intestate succession?50 
The court answered the above question in the affirmative 
but limited its application to certain circumstances.51  In order 
for a post-mortem-conception child to qualify as the legal child of 
the deceased, a two-part test must be met.52  First, the child 
must be shown to be the genetic child of the decedent.53  Second, 
the survivor must then establish that the “decedent affirmatively 
consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any 
resulting child.”54 
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts observed that the Massachusetts intestacy 
statute lacked an express requirement that children be alive or 
in existence at the time of their parents’ death.55  In the absence 
of an express legislative intent to require that posthumous 
children exist as of the date of the deceased parent’s death, the 
court engaged in a balancing test. 56  The court weighed the 
“[l]egislature’s overriding purpose to promote the welfare of all 
children,”57 against the legislative goals of “requiring certainty of 
filiation between the decedent and his issue,” and “establishing 
limitations periods for the commencement of claims against the 
intestate estate.”58 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed the 
 49. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 50. 760 N.E.2d at 259.  Although the question, as phrased by the court, 
applies only to married couples, it is doubtful any distinction between married 
and unmarried couples could be made.  In Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 
(1977), the Supreme Court held that removing children from their father’s line 
of intestate succession based on their legitimacy status to be unconstitutional. 
 51. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259. 
 52. See id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (noting that even where both parts of the test are met, “time 
limitations may preclude commencing a claim for succession rights on behalf of 
a posthumously conceived child.”). 
 55. See id. at 264. 
 56. See id. at 264-65. 
 57. Id. at 266. 
 58. Id. 
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effect of post-mortem conception on intestate succession in 
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart.59  Rhonda Gillett-Netting gave birth 
to twins from her husband’s sperm on August 6, 1996, 
approximately eighteen months after he died.60  Gillett-Netting 
sought to have her children declared as legally those of her 
deceased husband so that they could collect Social Security 
survivor's benefits.  After being denied by the Social Security 
Administration and the trial court,61 Gillett-Netting received a 
favorable ruling from the appellate court.62 
The appellate court noted that the issue before it was a 
matter of first impression for any court at the federal appellate 
level but also mentioned the recent opinion in Woodward.63  
Although the reasoning of the appellate court was consistent 
with that of the Woodward court, the Gillett-Netting court added 
significant dicta in its opinion regarding post-mortem-conception 
children and intestate succession.  The appellate court 
distinguished between legitimacy for the purposes of gaining 
survivors benefits and legitimacy for the purpose of inheriting 
under intestacy statutes.64  If the appellate court had found the 
children legitimate for all purposes, they would have had a right 
to inherit intestate from their father despite their status as post-
mortem-conception children. 
In sum, Trimble established that allowing intestate 
succession based on the legitimacy status of a child is 
unconstitutional.65  Soon after, Heart established the right of 
children to receive Social Security survivor benefits even if 
conceived after the death of a parent.66  Though the outcome in 
Heart was the result of a Social Security Administration 
decision, Woodward made this decision the law, at least in 
 59. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 60. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002), 
rev’d 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).  Mr. Netting had deposited his sperm to be 
frozen and stored for future use by his wife before he began treatment for 
cancer.  371 F.3d at 594. 
 61. See 231 F. Supp. 2d at 963-64. 
 62. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599. 
 63. Id. at 596 n.3. 
 64. Id. at 599 n.8 (“Because Juliet and Piers are Netting’s legitimate 
children under Arizona state law, we need not consider whether they could be 
deemed dependent for another reason, such as their ability to inherit property 
from their deceased father under Arizona intestacy laws.”). 
 65. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762. 
 66. See Kerekes, supra note 44. 
GREENFIELD J. Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago?  An Examination of Post-Mortem 
Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against Perpetuities. MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 2006;8(1):277-302.  
2007]  POST-MORTEM CONCEPTION AND INHERITANCE 287 
 
unti
imp
                                                          
Massachusetts.67  The position was further supported by the 
ninth circuit in Gillett-Netting.68 
D. THE EFFECT ON THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
The Rule against Perpetuities was created to prevent 
decedents from controlling assets from beyond the grave.69  The 
rule states, “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not 
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the 
creation of the interest.”70  Two of the most important facets of 
the rule are that it is a rule of logical proof71 and that an interest 
is not considered vested in a class as long as the class is subject 
to open.72  The rule is a rule of logical proof because it requires a 
possibility to be logically impossible before it will discount it (i.e., 
the fertile octogenarian73).  The second condition, the non-
vesting of an interest in a class subject to open, means that as 
long as it is possible for a class to be added to, then an interest 
does not vest in that class.  These two rules interact often; a 
testate gift to the class consisting of the children of X cannot vest
l X dies. 
As a rule of proof, the rule does not consider how unlikely or 
likely an event is to occur; so long as there exists any logical 
possibility, no matter how remote, of an occurrence, the rule 
takes it into account.74  The most commonly given examples of 
scenarios that are logically possible, though extremely 
robable, are the fertile octogenarian and the unborn widow.75 
 67. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 68. Gillet-Netting, 371 F.3d 593. 
 69. See Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity Of Well-Being and the 
Objectives of Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1746 (2003); DUKEMINIER & 
KRIER, supra note 10, at 303. 
 70. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 302. 
 71. Id. at 303. 
 72. Id. at 311. 
 73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP., infra note 75. 
 74. Id. at 303. 
 75. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.4 
reporter’s note 7, 8 (1983).  The fertile octogenarian scenario exists because the 
rule assumes that all people are capable of bearing children regardless of their 
age.  Id. cmt. h, reporter’s note 7.  Though this may have been absurd in the 
seventeenth century, when the rule originated, the same technology that makes 
post-mortem conception possible could make this scenario less absurd.  A classic 
example of the fertile octogenarian problem played out in real life is Jee v. 
Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787).  The unborn widow scenario 
holds that the phrase “X’s widow” refers to whoever is married to X at the time 
of X’s death not who is married to X at the time, and that said person may as yet 
be unborn at the time of the reference. 
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Analyzing the inheritance rights of post-mortem-conception 
children is a problem because of the combination of the rule’s two 
facets listed above (logical proof and open class).  For centuries, a 
gift “to all my children” or “to the heirs of my body” was 
understood to capture a closed class.  When a person died, the 
class of potential heirs would necessarily be fixed.76  This is no 
longer the case today, as a third and possibly much more far 
reaching
er.” 
Imagine Mr. Smith: Mr. Smith is divorced, has two children, 
and was recently diagnosed with cancer.  Desiring to have more 
children in the future, Mr. Smith has his sperm cryopreserved 
before chemotherapy.  The therapy is unsuccessful and Mr. 
Smith succumbs to the cancer.  Mr. Smith had the foresight to 
draft a will, and in this will he leaves his estate to “all my 
children upon reaching the age of 18,” with the exception of the 
cryogenically preserved sperm, which he leaves to his parents so 
that they might have more grandchildren through him.  For the 
purposes of the Rule against Perpetuities, the validating life at 
this point would most lik
dren and his parents.77 
Five years later, as Mr. Smith’s parents are on a drive with 
Mr. Smith’s two children, they die in a car accident.  Mr. Smith’s 
parents have left everything to Mr. Smith’s brother, their only 
remaining child.  Included in “everything” is the still-unused 
cryopreserved sperm.  Mr. Smith’s brother, seeking to replace 
the family he lost, finds a surrogate mother to be impregnated by 
his brother’s cryopreserved sperm.  The impregnation succeeds, 
and a child is born.  This child, biologically Mr. Smith’s, will not 
reach the age of eighteen (the qualifying age in Mr. Smith’s will) 
until twenty-three years after Mr. Smith’s death, thus violating 
the Rule against Perpetuities.  Due to this possibility, the entire 
gift to the class of his children is void
as the child’s interest 
rty to intestate succession, and his children would 
 76. Subject to the child in gestation exception discussed supra § I. 
 77. Generally, a validating life is any individual who can affect the vesting 
of the interest and whose life establishes that the interest will vest or fail within 
the Rule against Perpetuities period.  See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, 
at 303-04.  Either of Mr. Smith’s parents, being in control of his cryopreserved 
sperm, would thus qualify as validating lives so long 
vested within twenty-one years of each parent’s lifetime. 
 78. Though in this scenario it likely would not matter, as a voiding of the 
clause would resign his prope
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This scenario, while improbable, highlights the potential 
problems caused by the interaction of the Rule against 
Perpetuities and advances in assisted reproductive technology.  
The scenario is also now technologically possible and certainly 
not the most far-fetched logically possible scenario that can be 
conjured. 
Perhaps even more alarming is the possibility that a person 
may have had sperm cryogenically preserved and not have 
informed anyone of this fact before dying.  This scenario is very 
difficult to disprove with certainty and creates the possibility of 
post-mortem conception in almost every death.79  As a society, 
we want to avoid being in a position where we must invalidate 
every bequest “to my children” made since 1949.80  An 
alternative rule must be developed. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. HOW TO HANDLE INTESTATE SUCCESSION 
The two questions presented by the intersection of 
succession and advances in reproductive technology can be 
broken down into those concerning testate succession and those 
concerning intestate succession.  Of the two, testate succession 
and the effect of the Rule against Perpetuities presents the more 
intellectually interesting question.  However, the more pressing 
question and the one that has given rise to actual controversies 
is how to handle the intestate succession status of posthumously 
conceived children.  As previously noted, several courts have 
dealt with these questions; the consensus shows a strong 
favoring of the child’s right to inherit intestate. 
                                                   
most likely inherit that way. 
 79. Even if one could prove that a dead man’s sperm was not secretly 
cryopreserved during his life, we are not that far away from medical technology 
being able to clone the sperm cells of a dead man.  Scientists have already 
discovered methods for freezing spermatological stem cells, raising the 
possibility that cells can be frozen, thawed, cloned and refrozen.  See Bailey, 
supra note 12, at 745 (“[S]cientists at the University of Pennsylvania and the 
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center recently discovered a method 
for freezing spermatological stem cells, thereby raising the possibility of 
thawing, duplicating and implanting sperm cells for a century or more.”).  With 
these technological advances come even more radical possibilities for post-
mortem parentage. 
 80. A possibility which Bailey suggests is the state of the law.  See id. at 
790-91 (arguing that the possibility of post-mortem-conception children voids 
any bequest “to my children,” as well as a bequest “to the children of my good 
friend Frank Jones,” in any state with the classic Rule against Perpetuities). 
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Statutory attempts to solve problems associated with 
assisted reproductive technology and succession law generally 
conflict with court decisions.  While case-law has extended the 
time period when a child can inherit intestate (and be eligible for 
Social Security survivors benefits) after his or her father dies,81 
the Uniform Parentage Act82 provides only a 300 day period.83  
Similarly, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception 
Act does not consider a posthum
ring of the deceased parent.84 
In State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods,85 the court used 
definitive language in establishing the constitutional right to a 
legal determination of parentage.86  While such a right has yet to 
be invoked in any case involving a posthumously conceived 
child,87 there is little reason to believe that courts would limit 
this right to children whose parents are alive at their conception 
or birth.  Similarly, while no court has held that treating 
pretermitted children88 and posthumously conceived children 
differently for the purposes of determining intestate succession 
violates the equal protection clause,89 such a 
 81. See Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). 
 82. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a) (2002). 
 83. An important change that must be made to any statute/court opinion or 
statutory scheme dealing with this issue is that the time period should be 
changed from one concerning the date of birth, to one concerning the date of 
conception.  In Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, the plaintiff gave birth to her 
deceased husband’s child ten and one-half months after his death.  371 F. 2d 
593 (9th Cir. 2004).  Assuming thirty days per month, the birth occurred 315 
days after the husband’s death, missing the assumed validity period of the 
Uniform Parentage Act by only fifteen days; had the baby been born two weeks 
early, there may have been no controversy.  Creating a situation where there is 
incentive to try and induce early delivery serves the best interests of no one. 
 84. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILD. OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4(b) 
(1988). 
 85. 865 P.2d 33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
 86. “The child has a constitutionally protected interest in an accurate 
determination of paternity.” Id. at 37. 
 87. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 226. 
 88. Pretermitted children are those alive at the time of a parent’s death. 
 89. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 226. 
 90. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).  In Trimble, the Court 
concluded that "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility or wrongdoing.  Obviously, no child is responsible for 
his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual - as well as an 
unjust - way of deterring the parent."  430 U.S. at 769-70. 
GREENFIELD J. Dad Was Born A Thousand Years Ago?  An Examination of Post-Mortem 
Conception and Inheritance, with a Focus on the Rule Against Perpetuities. MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 2006;8(1):277-302.  
2007]  POST-MORTEM CONCEPTION AND INHERITANCE 291 
                                                          
It does not make sense to argue that illegitimate children 
have a right to inherit under intestate succession91 but that 
posthumously conceived children do not.  While it is possible, 
and perhaps even likely, that the father of an illegitimate child 
never intended to have that child, there is little reason for a man 
to have stored sperm (thereby giving rise to the possibility of 
posthumous conception) unless he intended it to be used to 
conceive his biological heir. 
Two different issues are involved in these situations, and I 
suggest a two-pronged analysis.  Of the three major cases that 
have dealt with succession rights of posthumously conceived 
children,92 all have dealt with rights to receive Social Security 
survivor's benefits. None of the three cases discussed whether a 
child conceived by post-mortem conception can inherit from a 
father intestate. 
Where Social Security benefits are concerned, any child born 
to the man’s wife or partner should qualify for survivors benefits.  
This reasoning follows from the ruling in Gillett-Netting,93 
merely extending the time beyond the eighteen-month period 
that was at issue in that case.  Unlike intestate inheritance from 
the estate of the deceased, survivor's benefits come from the 
government; hence, there is no adversarial interest on behalf of 
others who are in line to inherit from the estate. 
Where problems arise concerning intestate succession of an 
estate,94 leaving the estate open for the remainder of the life of 
the decedent’s spouse or partner is inefficient.  This could force 
others who have the possibility of inheriting through intestate 
succession to wait for a prolonged period.  A time period should 
be defined under which the spouse or partner can bear the child 
of the decedent and have it be considered as the decedent’s heir 
for intestate succession.  Rather than attempting to define a time 
period, I will focus on setting out guidelines for how such a 
period should be selected. 
A reasonable period for mourning should be allowed and 
 91. See id. at 770-71. 
 92. Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002), Hart v. 
Charter (Soc. Sec. Admin. Hearing) (March 27, 1995) (Torres, A.L.J.), and 
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F. 3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).  See supra § II.B. 
 93. Hart was settled out of court during the appeals process.  See Girl to Get 
Benefits in Death of Father Before Conception, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 1996, at 
A13. 
 94. Such a problem would arise in the case of an unmarried couple in a 
state where in the absence of surviving issue, the intestate estate goes to the 
parents or siblings of the decedent. 
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should be determined by an appropriate body which would 
include both legal and mental health experts.  There would then 
be a reasonable period for the spouse or partner to attempt to 
become pregnant using the decedent’s cryopreserved sperm.  
This period would take into account current success rates and 
provide for multiple attempts if necessary.95  By utilizing such a 
method of determining rights of intestate succession, a valid 
attempt is made to allow the spouse or partner to fulfill the 
wishes of the decedent to have a child (though he may not have 
contemplated that it would be posthumous), while 
acknowledging the interests of other parties in a speedy and 
absolute settling of the estate. 
B. CHANGE THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES? 
The problems associated with the Rule against Perpetuities 
only present themselves in the case of testate succession because 
there is no creation of an interest without a will.  In analyzing 
the treatment of posthumously conceived children, the following 
normative judgments are made: 
It is necessary that all posthumously conceived children 
born to the decedent’s spouse or partner be treated the same 
unless the decedent specifically provided for differentiation. 
It is necessary that all posthumously conceived children 
contemplated by the decedent be treated the same, unless the 
decedent explicitly provided for differentiation. 
It is preferable, but not necessary, that posthumously 
conceived children be treated the same as children 
alive/conceived at the time of the father’s death.96 
These judgments help to ensure that children are not placed 
into different, disadvantageous legal situations due to factors 
beyond their control.  To do otherwise would jeopardize a 
posthumously conceived child’s “constitutionally protected 
interest in an accurate determination of paternity.”97 
 95. The time period presumably would vary as technology progresses and in 
vitro attempts attain a higher success rate. 
 96. The first and second judgments ensure that a scheme will not be subject 
to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for granting children 
substantially different  legal rights based solely on birth order.  While it would 
be preferable from a normative point of view to treat posthumously-conceived 
children and pretermission children the same, no court has held this necessary 
as a matter of law. 
 97. Kerekes, supra note 2, at 226 (citing State ex rel. Henderson v. Woods, 
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Many suggestions have been made regarding the proper way 
to modify or eliminate the Rule against Perpetuities, either 
entirely or insofar as it affects the post-mortem conception issue.  
Some of the more provocative suggestions are discussed below.  
When viewed in light of the above mentioned criteria, all of these 
plans are unsatisfactory because they either treat posthumously 
conceived children differently for purposes of testate succession 
or treat posthumously conceived children contemplated by the 
decedent differently, or they make a distinction between 
posthumously conceived children and pretermitted children 
when there is no offsetting gain in ease of applicability. Those 
proposals which attempt to minimize or eliminate instances 
where they break from the above criteria do so by enacting a 
scheme which violates the constitutional boundaries established 
in previous court rulings.98 
i. Changes Already in Place 
Some commentators have suggested that the problem of 
post-mortem children and the Rule against Perpetuities can be 
solved through modifications of the rule.99 In fact, many states 
have already adopted modifications of the Rule against 
Perpetuities.100  The three main variations being implemented 
are the cy pres doctrine and two versions of the wait-and-see 
rule: the common law period and the ninety-year period.101  
865 P.2d 33, 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)). 
 98. The two most important court rulings that the suggested plans risk 
violating are Henderson, 865 P.2d 33 (1994) and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
726 (1997).  The Henderson court found a constitutionally protected right to a 
determination of parenthood.  865 P.2d at 37.  In Trimble, the Court found 
unequal treatment of children based on legitimacy in determination of intestate 
succession rights to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  430 U.S. at 
762.  The important characteristic of these decisions is that they were both 
based on constitutional rights, so a scenario presented which violates either of 
these holdings could not be gotten around with mere legislative action. 
 99. See, e.g., Steeb, supra note 4, at 160 (discussing the Uniform Probate 
Code’s determination concerning after born children, as well as the perspectives 
of the cy pres doctrine and the wait-and-see doctrine). 
 100. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 327-28 (noting that six 
states have adopted a “wait-and-see for the Common Law Perpetuities Period” 
approach, and that twenty-six states have at some point adopted the Uniform 
Statutory Rule against Perpetuities). 
 101. The ninety-year wait-and-see rule was adopted under the Uniform 
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) in 1974.  See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 
2-901(a)(1) (2006) (canonizing the ninety-year wait-and-see rule).  USRAP also 
superseded the wait-and-see common law rule during the same year.  See id. § 
2-906.  Under USRAP, a bequest is deemed valid if it complies with either 
variant of the wait-and-see rule.  DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 326. 
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However, none of the modifications, in and of themselves, will 
save a testamentary disposition “to all my children” from the 
voiding clause of the Rule against Perpetuities. 
The wait-and-see approach was first advocated by Harvard 
Law School Professor W. Barton Leach.102  Under a wait-and-see 
approach, an interest is not voided at the time of creation merely 
because it might violate the Rule against Perpetuities.  Instead, 
an appropriate time period is allowed to see if an actual violation 
occurs.103  An appropriate time period can be whatever is 
decided upon by the legislature, but the two most common 
approaches are the common law period, and the ninety-year 
period included in the Uniform Statutory Rule
etuities.104 
The cy pres doctrine “reforms a document to make the 
bequests conform to the Rule against Perpetuities if the 
testator’s intent can be protected.”105  Such a method would be 
ineffective in constructing an adequate situation where post-
mortem-conception children are concerned because of the myriad 
of logical possibilities that can occur.  New assisted reproductive 
technologies greatly increase the complexity of the cy pres 
analysis for a court because they give rise to a much broader 
range of scen
etuities.106 
Neither the common law wait-and-see approach, nor the 
ninety-year wait-and-see approach will be sufficient to fix the 
problem.  The common law wait-and-see approach fails, for 
example, in a case where a
death of his father.107 
 102. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 326-27. 
 103. Id. at 327. 
 104. The wait-and-see common law rule only invalidates a bequest when the 
interest neither vests nor fails within a life in being plus twenty-one years.  As 
such, this approach considers actual events, and not logically possible events, 
when applying the Rule against Perpetuities.  See id. at 327.  The ninety-year 
wait-and-see rule simply requires that an interest vest within ninety years of 
the testator’s death, thus eliminating the need for validating lives and 
minimizing the impact of improbable but possible deaths.  See id. at 327-28. 
 105. Steeb, supra note 4, at 160. 
 106. See Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 611-12.  By increasing the 
constraints on what a court can do, the courts will become more limited in their 
ability to satisfy the donor’s intent while making sure that the modification does 
not violate the Rule against Perpetuities. 
 107. See Baby Born from 21-Year-Old Sperm, supra note 24. 
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While a real-world situation that would violate the ninety-
year wait-and-see rule is undoubtedly rare, it is logically and 
technologically possible.108  A ninety-year wait-and-see rule 
presents a problem by putting the burden on those waiting to 
inherit to disprove a possibility of post-mortem conception 
during those ninety years.  It would be almost impossible to 
prove the non-existence of cryopreserved sperm, leading to 
situations where every gift “to m
years following a man’s death. 
he “Rule of Convenience” 
The “rule of convenience”, created by Professor Barton 
Leach109 and outlined by Professor Kristine Knaplund closes a 
class as soon as the interest vests in at least one member of the 
class.110  The rule of convenience is supposed to balance three 
conflicting concerns of the common law Rule against 
Perpetuities: the presumption that the testator intended to 
include all members of a class, the presumption that a testator 
would prefer speedy dissolution of his or her estate, and the 
presumption that a testator would want his or her gift to survive 
the Rule against Perpetuities.111  Knaplund outlines fi
arios where the rule of convenience would come into play. 
Two of Knaplund’s scenarios are particularly troubling, both 
in light of morality and the current state of the law.112  The first 
troubling scenario involves situations where “the will devises 
something ‘to my children’ and there are children at the father’s 
death.”113  Under the “rule of convenience,” the class of children 
who would inherit is then closed at the father’s death.  While 
this allows a definitive answer regarding who has a right to 
inherit, it cuts off all after-born heirs.  Some may argue that this 
is an unacceptable solution because it cuts off all after-born heirs 
when there is no evidence of the decedent’s intent to do so.  
There is also an argument to be made that because the father’s 
will included a class rather than naming specific individuals, he 
 108. See Ashley, supra note 23. 
 109. See Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 614. 
 110. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 108. 
 111. Id. 
 112. The other three scenarios include: the father’s will expressly includes 
post-mortem children in its terms, the will is silent on children, and the will 
devises a remainder to the decedent’s children.  Id. at 110.  These scenarios 
would necessitate the change envisioned by the rule of convenience, but would 
not lead to objectionable situations involving posthumously conceived children. 
 113. Id. 
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intended to include all members of the class and not just the 
individual members of the class of which he knew.114  
Furthermore, such a distinction between heirs based on time of 
birth could give rise to constitutional equal protection claims 
from the posthumously conceived child.115  A court is thus forced 
to differentiate between illegitimate children alive at the time of 
the father’s death and posthumously conceived children.  Des
e weaknesses, this solution is acceptable and necessary. 
The second troubling scenario, outlined by Knaplund, is one 
in which the father dies, leaves a bequest “to all my children,” 
has no children at the time of his death, but his cryopreserved 
sperm is later used to conceive a child.116  In this case, the rule of 
convenience would close the class of the father’s children at the 
birth of the first posthumously conceived child.  This child would 
then inherit the entire bequeathment, and any other 
posthumously conceived children would not be members of the 
class, thus inheriting nothing.  Even though the court would 
likely draw a distinction between living and after-born children 
so as to allow this scenario, it is doubtful that it would find a 
distinction based solely on birth order constitutional.  The rule of 
convenience therefore, in at least one scenario, gives rise to 
unsatisfactory results and must be r
answer to the problem in and of itself. 
epealing the Rule Against Perpetuities 
Some have argued for the complete repeal of the Rule 
against Perpetuities.117  The justification for repealing the rule 
is that the purpose for whic
ger a concern of modern society: 
[L]ogic could lead one to argue that a social policy device first sculpted 
to prevent the aggregation of assets in the hands of several hundred 
noble families at a time when London, the largest city in the common 
law world, had less than 10,000 inhabitants, has outlived its 
 114. See id. at 108. 
 115. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that differentiating 
the status of children for inheritance purposes based on legitimacy was 
unconstitutional). 
 116. See Knaplund, supra note 5, at 109. 
 117. See, e.g., Keith L. Butler, Long Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1237 (2000); G. 
Graham Waite, Let's Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93 
(1992); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or The RAP 
Has No Friends--An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000). 
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justification.  While certain ownership patterns were politically and 
economically undesirable for a feudal sovereign, 
resent a clear danger in our modern society.118 
While repealing the rule would end the problem, a host of 
new problems would emerge.119  Professors Levin and Mulroney 
suggest that the rule could be replaced by a carefully constructed 
estate tax,120 but it is unclear how this would provide guidance 
in determining the status of posthumously conceived children 
under a “to all my children” bequest.  If we are going to set an 
arbitrary deadline for the child to be born following the father’s 
death, it is unclear why we could not do this by merely extending 
the Rule against Perpetuities vesting period by this same 
amount of time.  
iv. Case-by-Case Exclusion 
Another suggestion is to exclude posthumously conceived 
children on a case-by-case basis.  “If an interest would be invalid 
under the common law Rule [against Perpetuities] by including 
after-born persons within a class, after-borns shall be excluded 
from the class to the extent necessary to avoid a violation under 
the common law Rule.”122  This rule is problematic, however, 
because it would exclude all posthumously conceived children 
whose inheritance would violate the Rule against Perpetuities, 
even those specifically provided for (either individually or as a 
class) in the decedent’s will.  
 118. Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 618 (quoting Leonard Levin & 
Michael Mulroney, The Rule against Perpetuities and Generation-Skipping Tax: 
Do We Need Both?, 35 VILL. L. Rev. 333, 356 (1990)). 
 119. In addition to the problems which the rule was originally intended to 
solve, problems added by the possibility of posthumously conceived children 
would be how to craft a plan that would allow living children to take from the 
estate while acknowledging the possibility of future born heirs, and their right 
to inherit. 
 120. Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 619.  The estate tax would be 
crafted in such a way as to make long-term control of assets “prohibitively 
expensive.”  Hoffman & Morriss acknowledge that this is a very unlikely 
scenario, as the government is currently considering whether to phase out the 
estate tax permanently.  Id. 
 121. It is important to note that setting an arbitrary deadline may give rise 
to the constitutional issue discussed supra § II – B. 
 122. Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 13, at 620 (quoting Ira Mark Bloom, 
Perpetuities Refinement: There Is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. Rev. 23, 70 
(1987)). 
 123. See id. at 621. 
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v. Hoffman/Morriss Proposal 
Hoffman and Morriss propose including a provision in any 
will that does not mention posthumously conceived children, 
providing that “nothing in this will shall be construed to provide 
an inheritance for any posthumously born individuals.”124 
This adaptation of the Hoffman/Morriss proposal is 
problematic both because of the logistical problems with 
implementing it and its application to real world scenarios.125  
What if the decedent provided for all his posthumously born 
children, without regard to the identity of the mother?  The 
Hoffman/Morriss proposal does not provide a way for this 
bequest to survive a Rule against Perpetuities problem, even 
though the rule would presumably honor the explicit request of 
the decedent.  Morriss and Hoffman claim that the perpetuities 
problems can be solved by “saving” clauses, instructing courts to 
construe testate documents in ways that would not violate the 
Rule against Perpetuities.126  However such a claim is short-
sighted.  Saving clauses will be ineffective in dealing with the 
possibility of posthumously conceived children born centuries 
after the death of the father.
modified the rule’s logical p
clause is good in perpetuity.127 
vi. Redefine a Life in Being 
It has been suggested that a “life in being” for purposes of 
validating an interest should be redefined to include the entire 
time period of a male’s reproductive capacity.128  Other possible 
redefinitions of a life in being are to extend the decedent’s life in 
being for a set time, the lifetime of the woman to whom the 
cryopreserved 
                                                          
 124. Id. at 624.  The presumption would be rebuttable.  Id. 
 125. For instance, what standard of proof would be needed to rebut the 
e decedent, is not a disinterested party. 
ings clause is designed to “terminate 
measuring lives plus 21 years, if the 
presumption?  Also, the decedent’s spouse/partner, the person who is most likely 
to know the intentions of th
 126. Id. at 627 (explaining that “‘savings’ clauses . . . instruct courts to fix 
problems that may arise”). 
 127. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, at 312.  A savings clause is 
used in conjunction with a trust.  The sav
the trust . . . at the expiration of specified 
trust has not previously terminated.”  Id. 
 128. See Kerekes, supra note 2, at 242. 
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Redefining a life in being to include a man’s reproductive 
capabilities may have been a viable option a decade ago, but with 
the recent advances in reproductive technology and the 
possibility raised by scientists that sperm can be cryogenically 
preserved for centuries,130 this is no longer a viable option. 
Defining a life in being as the time period of a male’s 
reproductive capability has the effect of bestowing immortality, 
and a bequest has the possibility of surv
 against Perpetuities in perpetuity. 
Redefining the term life in being to include a set amount of 
time after the death of the father is undesirable for two reasons.  
First, it violates the criteria set out in the beginning of this 
section that all posthumously conceived children be afforded 
equal treatment.  Second, it could place whomever the 
cryopreserved sperm was bequeathed to in a position where that 
person must make a choice between using it to conceive a child 
before he or she is physically or emotionally ready, and 
alternatively waitin
d’s legal rights. 
Measuring the life based on the status of the woman to 
whom the cryopreserved sperm has been left has some validity. 
However, such a modification assumes that only a bequest to the 
female partner of the decedent would be made or allowed.  In 
doing so, it fails to provide for the Mr. Smith hypothetical, supra, 
where the sperm is left to a party for its eventu
party who is not the dece
Proposed Solution 
The proposed solution involves excluding, as a bright-line 
rule, posthumously conceived children from a bequest “to all my 
children.”  This scenario does away with any arbitrary time 
periods under which a child can be conceived a
uded in the class of the decedent’s children. 
There is one scenario that still gives rise to a problem, the 
answer to which is not clear under the above-mentioned 
proposal.  Imagine that a husband and wife are attempting to 
conceive a child by artificial insemination.  On his way to work, 
the husband is involved in a fatal accident.  Unaware of this, his 
                                                          
 129. See id. at 242-43.  If the woman to whom the cryopreserved sperm was 
left remarry, she would need to file a sworn statement of intent not to use the 
sperm.  Id. at 43. 
 130. See Q & A: Frozen Sperm, supra note 23. 
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wife proceeds to her appointment that afternoon and undergoes 
successful insemination.  The child would, strictly speaking, be 
posthumously conceived.  The first reaction to this problem 
might be to create a one-day grace period, but certainly there are 
situations where two or three days might pass.  What about the 
soldier’s wife whose husband is captured and she undergoes this 
procedure during the weeks or months when his status is 
unknown?  It would be better to add a reasonable knowledge 
requirement instead of having a grace period in these situations.  
The spouse or partner undergoing artificial insemination must 
know, or should reasonably know, of the demise of her spouse or 
partner.  While there will still be questions as to when it would 
be reas
, and as such can more easily be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis. 
For circumstances where there is a provision in the will for 
posthumous children, different analyses must be used depending 
on the nature of the bequest.  Two types of posthumous bequests 
are possible: those that pick out a l
eived children and those made to a general class, “to my 
posthumously conceived children.” 
For those bequests that pick out a limited class of 
posthumously conceived children, the bequest would be allowed 
to stand.  For instance, if a man were to leave half of his estate 
to “his first posthumously conceived child,” half of his estate 
could be held in trust for said child.  Even if such a child were 
never to be conceived, the bequest would still be valid, and the 
inheritance would just be held in a perpetual trust.131  Though 
this would treat two posthumously born children different based 
solely on their birth order, the decedent’s will expresses an 
explicit wish to do so.  Just as it is legally permissible to leave 
one’s entire estate to one’s firstborn child and nothing to all 
other children,132 it would be legally permissible to provide only 
for the first posthumously conceived child.  A similar analysis is 
 131. If some upper end to the viability of cryogenically preserved sperm is 
later found, the trust would expire at the end of this viability period. 
 132. In the case where pretermitted children are omitted from a will, section 
2-302 of the Uniform Probate Code provides a share of the estate to the omitted 
child unless “it appears that the omission was intentional.”  Steeb, supra note 4, 
at 158 (quoting UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302(b)(1)).  In the circumstances where 
the first posthumously conceived child is identified as such, it is fair to surmise 
that this clause intentionally excluded all after-born posthumous children. 
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will still be eligible for Social Security survivors benefits so long 
as they meet the criter i) supra. 
les, yet remains flexible 
enou
                                                          
applicable if a clause in the will were to divide a portion of the 
decedent’s estate among “the first x posthumous children born,” 
or “any posthumous children born within time period y.”  Though 
these later scenarios present potential perpetuities problems, the 
rule can be adjusted using a combination of provisions fr
ified rules already in place, while still falling within the 
three provisions outlined in the beginning of this section. 
Any bequest “to all of my posthumously conceived children” 
would be invalidated.  The decedent’s estate would be divided as 
if the provision did not exist.133  This solution is no worse then 
the treatment of other created interests which violate the Rule 
against Perpetuities.  The benefit from this proposal is that it 
provides to those who are alive and are supposed to inherit a 
portion of the decedent’s finality in their possession of the estate.  
It should also be noted that post-mortem-conception children 
who have a bequeathment to them invalidated und
ia set out in § III(A)(
IV. CONCLUSION 
Technology has advanced at rates far outpacing other facets 
of our intellectual lives; this is perhaps truer than in the field of 
biology than anywhere else.  Despite the recognition over four 
decades ago of the problems that would be posed by advances in 
reproductive technology, the legislative and executive branches 
of our government have not seen fit to come up with a 
satisfactory solution.  The courts have thus been left in a 
position where they must interpret laws that were written 
without contemplation of today’s technology and decide how to 
apply them to situations never envisioned by the drafters.  More 
troubling for the legal community is that court decisions can 
quickly be made obsolete by even further advances in technology.  
A comprehensive scheme must be adapted to deal with the 
advances in reproductive technology which takes account of past 
court rulings and common law princip
gh to deal with situations that were not contemplated by 
the drafters of these rulings/principles. 
Many options have been put forth for how to deal with the 
problems posed by advancing technology.  Some of the earlier 
 133. This is the same treatment given to normal testamentary interests that 
violate the Rule against Perpetuities.  See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 10, 
ch. 4(E)(4). 
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lize that we are not 
star
mously conceived 
chil
ness of this cutoff 
is b
uture technology, 
thus
while trying to maximize 
respect for the decedent’s wishes without undoing the purpose 
for which the rule was first enacted. 
proposed solutions fail because they did not realize the eventual 
possibilities that would develop, nor the widespread 
implementation and success of the technology.  Others are 
unsatisfactory because they do not rea
ting on a clean slate, but must make any new scheme fit the 
basic principles of past rulings/principles. 
When it comes to testate succession, it seems best to enact 
clear bright-line rules that are independent of current 
technological practices and that rely on best matching the 
decedent’s intent with the original purpose of the Rule against 
Perpetuities.  By disallowing the inclusion of posthumously 
conceived children from inclusion in an “all my children” clause, 
we ensure that estates will not be indefinitely held in trust, 
thereby decreasing their social utility.  The same socially 
negative effect would be possible if testate clauses picking out all 
posthumously conceived children were allowed.  By still allowing 
for testators to single out particular posthumously conceived 
children or determinable groups of posthu
dren, people are given the chance to ensure that their estate 
is distributed in the manner they most prefer. 
By setting a firm cutoff for children to inherit under 
intestate succession, bereaved parties are given the opportunity 
to fulfill the wishes of deceased loved ones, even if those wishes 
were not explicitly stated in a will.  The harsh
lunted by allowing posthumously conceived children to be 
eligible for Social Security survivor's benefits. 
The proposal set forth in this article also takes into account 
current technology and possible advances in f
 preventing situations encountered in the past when 
proposed solutions were shortsighted in scope. 
Finally, this proposal falls within the framework laid out by 
the courts for intestate succession while maximizing the rights of 
the posthumously conceived child, without unduly burdening 
others in line for intestate succession.  Similarly, the proposed 
methods for fixing problems relating to the Rule against 
Perpetuities provides for equal protection of equally situated 
posthumously conceived children, 
